Intuitively, GY dominates G2 if every decisionmaker whose utility is increasing in 0 prefers gamble Gx to gamble G2. It is well known that Gx dominates G2 in this sense if and only if for every 0, Gx(0) < G2(0), with strict inequality for some value of 0.4
To investigate the "more favorable than" relation, let G be a prior distribution for 6 that assigns probabilities g(6) and g(6) to two possible values 0 and 6 of 6. By Bayes' theorem,
1 I also assume for simplicity that the densities are positive everywhere. The propositions in this section are true exactly as stated for general measurable spaces and general density functions. 2 A distribution is degenerate if it assigns probability one to a single point y, and nondegenerate otherwise. 3 More precisely, the strict inequality must hold for all increasing functions U such that both j UdGt and j UdG2 are finite. 4 One could also define "more favorable than" by using second-order stochastic dominance.
A distribution G, dominates G2 in this sense if for every increasing concave function U, UdGx < I UdG2-When G has two-point support, these concepts of dominance are identical; so (2) is necessary to conclude that x is more favorable than y in either sense. As Proposition 1 shows, it is also sufficient. Each investor is endowed with one unit each ofthe risky and riskless securities. The conclusion follows easily. Q.E.D.
MILGROM
H(x) = h(d)dG(d\x),(6)
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In this principal-agent model, the MLRP assumption captures the intuitive idea that greater profits are evidence of greater effort by the agent, so that the fee schedule should slope upwards to provide the correct incentives. Indeed, 
